Participants made judgments about stimulus materials in which there were 2 possible causes of an outcome. One of these was a common factor, a factor present in all instances presented for judgment, and the other was a positive covariate of the outcome. Instead of interpreting the positive covariate as the cause, participants consistently preferred an interpretation in which the common factor was the cause and the positive covariate enabled the cause to produce its effect. Participants' judgments of both interpretations were predicted by the proportion of instances that were confirmatory for the interpretation and not by AJP. The findings support a hypothesis that people have a multirole conceptualization of causality including, in addition to the roles of cause and effect, that of an enabler, a factor the presence of which ensures that a thing is in a state of readiness to produce a particular effect.
People may use many kinds of information to make judgments about the causes of various occurrences, including such things as similarity and temporal contiguity. One kind of information, the use of which has been extensively investigated, is information about the pattern of association between an effect and a candidate cause across a series of instances. For example, if I want to find out whether a certain ingredient in food is causing an allergic reaction, then I might obtain information about a number of meals, some containing the ingredient and some not, to ascertain whether the allergic reaction tends to occur after meals containing the ingredient. This is called contingency information, information about instances in which a causal candidate is either present or absent and an effect either occurs or does not occur.
Such information can be represented in a 2 X 2 table. Table 1 shows the conventional labels for the four cells of the table; those conventions are adopted in this article where appropriate. An objective measure of contingency between cause and effect is provided by the A/> statistic: AP = p{E!C) -p(Ef-Q, where p{EIC) = the probability that the effect occurs when the cause is present and p(Ef-C) = the probability that the effect occurs when the cause is absent . In terms of Table 1 , &P = (a/a + b) -(c/c + d).
The present research is concerned with the particular case in which there are two causal candidates in a set of instances. One candidate is common to all the instances in the set and is called a common factor. 1 The other is a. positive covariate of the outcome. I shall claim that, under defined circumstances, the common factor is more likely to be identified as the cause of the outcome than is the positive covariate. The circumstances involve reference to a particular kind of causal role called an enabler. I first introduce the concept of an enabler and then discuss how causal interpretations that identify enablers are made from contingency information about common factors and covariates.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter A. White, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, P.O. Box 901, Cardiff CF10 3YG, United Kingdom. Electronic mail may be sent to whttepa@ Cardiff.ac .uk. Consider an example. If I want a cup of tea, then I press a button on a kettle and the heating element in the kettle then operates to boil water. It can only do this, however, if it is plugged into a socket and the power switch for that socket is in the "on" position. In other words, the switch being on enables the heating element to produce the effect of the water boiling when I press the button on the kettle. This illustrates the concept of an enabler: It is something that makes it possible for a cause to produce its effect.
More formally, an enabler can be defined as a condition the satisfaction of which ensures that a thing is in a state of readiness to produce a particular effect (Ayers, 1968; Harre & Madden, 1975) . Enablers can be intrinsic properties of the thing that produces the effect. For example, "the presence of an engine is an intrinsic enabling condition for a car to have the power to move" (Harre & Madden, 1975, p. 88) . Enablers can also be extrinsic to the thing: A wall switch being in the "on" position is an extrinsic enabler for an electrical appliance plugged into that socket to have the power to operate.
A thing cannot be an enabler in isolation, so to speak; a thing can be an enabler only for a particular cause to produce a particular effect. Thus, the presence of an engine in a car enables that car to move but does not enable the car to change color, nor does it enable any other car to move. An enabler therefore has a specific function with respect to a particular cause and effect. In the case of the car, the presence of the engine has a specific function with respect to the actions the driver performs to make the car move. 1 It is important to distinguish between common factors and constant factors. In conditioning research, constant factors are factors that are present all the time, not only on all trials but also between trials. They include such things as the geography of the experimental chamber and the ambient temperature. A common factor is here defined as a factor that is present on every trial but not (or not necessarily) between trials. For example, in the present experiments, the common factor is a substance in meals eaten by a hypothetical patient. This factor is present only when the patient eats one of the meals in the sample presented for judgment. A meal is a trial, so it is present on every trial, but not between trials. It is a common factor, under the present definition, but not a constant factor. Enablers are therefore defined in terms of their function in relation to causes and effects. Putting it loosely, enabling is a certain kind of job that a thing does, the job of making it possible for a particular cause to produce its effect. Enablers are not defined in terms of their empirical relations with causes or effects. In this respect they are fundamentally different from such things as necessary or sufficient conditions, or both. A necessary condition, for example, is usually defined empirically as a condition that is never absent when the effect occurs (Sosa & Tooley, 1993) . Being an enabler does have implications for empirical relations; for example, if X is an enabler for C to produce E, then E will not occur when X is absent, as long as there is no alternative enabler. However, such implications do not form part of the definition of an enabler.
WHITE

2
The central contention of this article is that people understand the functional role that enablers play in the production of effects. They understand, for example, the function of the presence of an engine in enabling a car to move and the function of a wall switch being on in enabling a kettle to boil water. At a more abstract level, they understand that the production of effects by causes is made possible by the presence of enablers and that a particular cause cannot produce its effect if one of its enablers is absent or incapacitated. That is to say, people possess a general conceptualization of causality as involving multiple functional roles; causes, effects, and enablers are three of the functional roles in that general conceptualization.
First, some terminological conventions must be established. The common factor is designated CF, the positive covariate P, and the effect E. Several causal interpretations will be judged. One interpretation identifies CF as the cause and P as the enabler, and this is designated the CF p interpretation, where the subscript denotes the enabler. Another interpretation identifies P as the cause and mentions no enabler, and this is designated the P cause interpretation. Another interpretation identifies CF as the cause and mentions no enabler, and this is designated the CF cause interpretation. The CF p interpretation is an example of an enabled cause interpretation, meaning an interpretation that identifies both a cause and an enabler for that cause to produce its effect. The P cause and CF cause interpretations are both examples of simple cause interpretations, meaning interpretations that assign no roles other than cause and effect. With reference to the effect, "+" means that the effect occurs, and "-" means that it does not occur. Where there is a common factor, there are four types of contingency information: CFP+ (CF and P both present, effect occurs, equivalent to Cell a), CFP-(CF and P both present, effect does not occur, equivalent to Cell b), CF+ (CF present, P absent, effect occurs, equivalent to Cell c), and CF-(CF present, P absent, effect does not occur, equivalent to Cell d).
In the case of a single causal candidate, in terms of Table 1 , Cells a and d are conventionally interpreted as confirmatory for that candidate because instances of those types tend to increase AP (unless the relevant conditional probability does not change) and Cells b and c are conventionally interpreted as disconfirmatory because instances of those types tend to decrease AP. Thus, for the P cause interpretation, CFP+ and CF-are confirmatory because they are equivalent to Cells a and d, respectively, and CFP-and CF+ are disconfirmatory because they are equivalent to Cells b and c, respectively. But the evidential implications for the CF p interpretation are exactly the same. Clearly, an occurrence of the effect when the putative cause and enabler are both present is confirmatory, and a nonoccurrence of the effect when the enabler is absent (CF-) is confirmatory as well. The effect should not occur when the putative enabler is absent, so CF+ is disconfirmatory. If cause and enabler are both present, then the effect should not fail to occur, so CFP-is disconfirmatory as well.
Objectively, therefore, when there is a common factor, every possible pattern of information has the same evidential implications for the P cause and CF p interpretations, so there appears to be no way to choose between them. However, if people have a multiple role conceptualization of causality, then, other things being equal, they should tend to prefer causal interpretations that fill all three of the functional roles to interpretations that fill only two of them. This is because the former kind of interpretation tends to be viewed as more nearly complete and as conforming better to their general conceptualization of causality. People should therefore tend to prefer the CF p interpretation to the P cause interpretation. The CF p interpretation is preferred because all three causal roles of cause, enabler, and effect are filled, whereas in the P cause interpretation one of those roles (the enabler) is unspecified and the interpretation therefore appears incomplete. Experiment 1 was designed to test this reasoning.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, a medical scenario was used in which the two causal candidates (CF and P) were fictitious food additives and the outcome was the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an allergic reaction in a human patient. Each judgmental problem identified a different patient and presented information about a series of meals eaten by the patient, specifying whether each additive was present or absent and whether the patient had an allergic reaction or not. Judgmental problems were constructed in six distinct groups, called subsets, each of which manipulated different factors. There were 22 problems in all. The factor identified as CF was not a common factor in all 22 problems; some subsets were designed so that conditions with a common factor were compared with otherwise similar conditions in which the factor was not present in all instances. Participants in one condition judged the CF p interpretation and the P cause interpretation. Participants in another 2 A necessary condition also differs from an enabler in being defined in relation to the effect, not the cause. An enabler cannot be defined in relation to the effect because a given effect may have more than one cause, and a factor may be an enabler for one cause of the effect but not for another. In the latter case, it could be absent under some occurrences of the outcome. Because of this, a factor can only be defined as an enabler in relation to a particular cause. Subset   1  1  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3 The principal features of the stimulus information in each subset are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents actual frequencies of the different kinds of events. Table 3 presents information about the following variables: p(E), the probability of the effect occurring; p(CF), the probability of CF being present; p(P), the probability of P being present; p(P/CF), the probability of P being present when CF is present; p(E/CF), the probability of the effect occurring when CF is present; p(E/P), the probability of the effect occurring when P is present; AP(P); AP(CF). The last column, pCI, is the proportion of confirmatory instances; this statistic will be explained in Discussion of Experiment 1. The probabilities in Table 3 were achieved by setting the frequencies of the various pairings.
The various probabilities in Table 3 can all be computed from the frequency information in Table 2 . To illustrate, consider Subset 1, CF common. To compute p(P/CF), divide the number of instances in which CF and P are both present (12 + 6 = 18) by the number of instances in which CF is present (12 + 6 + 2 + 4 = 24), giving 18/24 = 0.75. To compute AP(P), first compute p(E/P), which is the number of occurrences of the outcome when P is present (12 + 0 = 12), then divide by the number of instances on which P is present (12 + 6 + 0 + 0= 18). Then compute p(E/-P), which is the number of occurrences of the outcome when P is absent (2 + 0 = 2), and divide by the number of instances on which P is absent (2 + 4 + 0 + 0 = 6). Then AP(P) = p(E/P) -p(E/-P) = (12/18) -(2/6) -.67 -.33 = +.33. When CF is a common factor, AP(CF) cannot be computed because there are no instances in which CF is absent and therefore no value for p(E/-CF). In the problem from Subset 1 for which CF is not a common factor, however, AP(CF) is computed as follows. First compute p(E/CF), the number of occurrences of the outcome when CF is present (6 + 1 = 7), then divide by the number of instances on which CF is present (6 + 3 + 1 + 2 = 12). Then compute p(E/-CF), the number of occurrences of the outcome when CF is absent (2 + 3 = 5), and divide by the number of instances on which CF is absent (2 + 1+3 + 6= 12). This gives AP(CF) = p(E/CF) -p(E/-CF) = (7/12) -(5/12) = .58 -.42 = + .16.
The Results section is organized in terms of the predictions described below, not in terms of the six subsets. However, brief descriptions of the variables manipulated in each subset will now be given as an adjunct to the information in Tables 2 and 3 . A more detailed account, focusing on the problem of confounding variables, can be found in Appendix A, Subset 1 consisted of two problems: CF was a common factor in one, and in the other CF was a positive covariate with AP = +.16. In Subset 2, there were four problems. In one problem, CF was a common factor; in the other three, CF was a positive covariate with AP = 0, +.33, and +.67. Each of the remaining four subsets had four problems manipulating two factors. In Subset 3, CF was either a common factor or present on 50% of trials with AP(CF) = 0, and p(P) was either .33 or .67. In Subset 4, CF+ frequency was manipulated with either 4 or 8 instances, and AP(P) was either +.6 or +.33. In Subset 5, CF+ and CFP-frequency were manipulated, each with either 0 or 6 instances. In Subset 6, CF+ frequency was manipulated with either 2 or 8 instances, and CFP+ frequency was manipulated with either 8 or 16 instances.
The argument that people should tend to prefer causal interpretations that fill all three of the functional roles to interpretations that fill only two of them generates the prediction that the CF p interpretation will tend to receive higher ratings than the P cause interpretation when CF is a common factor. It also generates the prediction that the CF p interpretation will tend to receive higher ratings than the CF cause interpretation when CF is a common factor. When CF is not a common factor, these predictions hold only when AP for the relation between each candidate and the effect is controlled. It is well established that causal judgments vary in a way that is closely related to AP (Allan, 1993; Cheng, 1997; Shanks, 1995) . For this reason, if CF and P have different values of AP, then the tendency for the more complex interpretation to be preferred is likely to be overridden by the tendency to give higher ratings to the candidate having the higher contingency with the effect. Therefore, a preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cause and CF cause interpretations is not predicted when CF is not a common factor.
It is also of interest to investigate to what extent ratings of CF as cause are elevated when it is part of a complex causal interpretation. One way of achieving this is to compare a given factor as a common factor with the same factor as a positive covariate, that is to say, holding constant the presence of a second factor and its contingency with the effect. This comparison was planned as part of Experiment 1. Ideally, the manipulation should control all factors except the relationship between the common factor and the effect; that is, the factor in question should be a common factor in one condition and a covariate with a certain contingency with the effect in another, and everything else should be the same across this manipulation. This was accomplished in one subset of Experiment I (Subset 1), but could only be done at the cost of having a modest positive correlation between the two factors, CF and P. A second subset (Subset 2) was therefore constructed in which there was zero correlation between CF and P: This in turn could be accomplished only by relaxing control of one other variable, p(E/CF), the probability of the effect occurring given that CF is present.
Experiment 1 was also designed to test a hypothesis that CF+ instances have a greater disconfirmatory effect than CFP-instances on judgments of the CF p interpretation. This hypothesis was not supported by the results, and for the sake of clarity it will be given minimal attention in the rest of this article, but three subsets in Experiment 1 were designed to test it, and the predictions for each will be briefly described. Subset 4 manipulated CF+ frequency and AP(P) independently; it was predicted that ratings of the CF p interpretation would vary with the frequency of CF+ trials and not with AP(P), and that ratings of the P cause interpretation would vary with AP(P) but not with CF+ frequency. Subset 5 was designed with identical orthogonal manipulations of CF+ frequency and CFP-frequency; under the hypothesis about the relative importance of these two types of information, it was predicted that the manipulation of CF+ frequency should have a greater effect on judgments of the CF p interpretation than the manipulation of CFP-frequency. Subset 6 manipulated CF+ frequency and CFP+ frequency independently while holding CFP-frequency and CF-frequency constant, testing the prediction that judgment of the CF p interpretation is affected by the manipulation of CF+ frequency.
Summary of Predictions for Experiment I
1. The CF p interpretation should be consistently preferred to P cause interpretation when there is a common factor. This prediction does not apply when there is no common factor.
2. The CFp interpretation should be consistently preferred to CF cause interpretation when there is a common factor. This prediction does not apply when there is no common factor.
3. CF+ instances should have a greater disconfirmatory effect than CFP-instances on judgments of the CF p interpretation. No such difference is predicted for judgments of the P cause interpretation.
4. Ratings of a common factor should be elevated when it is part of a complex causal interpretation.
Each of these predictions is addressed in a separate subsection of the Results. Another main aim of this research is to propose and test a model of judgment for enabled cause interpretations when there is a common factor. This will be addressed in the light of the results of Experiment 1.
Method Participants
The participants were 74 first-year undergraduate students of psychology at Cardiff University, participating in return for course credit.
Stimulus Materials
As described above, the materials comprised 22 judgmental problems. Each problem presented information about a series of meals eaten by a patient. For each meal, information was given about whether each of two candidate causes was present or absent and whether the patient had an allergic reaction or not. Two causal interpretations were presented for judgment.
Interpretations. Participants were divided into two groups. In one group, called the enabling group, participants judged the following two interpretations: " [CF] causes the patient's allergic reactions but it is only enabled to do so by the presence of [P]" (the CF p interpretation). *' [P] causes the patient's allergic reactions" (the P cause interpretation).
In the other group, called the nonenabling group, participants were required to judge the following two interpretations: " [CF] causes the patient's allergic reactions" (the CF cause interpretation). " [P] causes the patient's allergic reactions" (the P cause interpretation).
Instructions for judgment. The following initial instructions were given to participants in the enabling group:
Imagine that you are a doctor investigating patients suffering from severe allergic reactions. You are trying to find out whether their allergic reactions are caused by substances in the food they eat. People vary a great deal in the way they are affected by different substances, and you have to assess each one on an individual basis.
You are investigating the effects on some of your patients of two particular food additives, sodium trisulphate (ST) and Wassmeier's Salts (WS). You ask your patients to eat a certain number of meals in which the food additives are either present or absent. So, for each patient, you'll see information about several different meals, showing whether ST was present or absent in a given meal, whether WS was present or absent in the meal, and whether the patient had an allergic reaction or not. You can have a look at the first one now to see how the information is laid out.
For each patient you will be given two statements and you have to judge to what extent each of them is true for that patient. The two statements are as follows;
1. ST causes the patient's allergic reactions, but it is only enabled to do so by the presence of WS.
2. WS causes the patient's allergic reactions.
To make your judgment, write a number from 0 (zero) to 100 beside each statement. 0 (zero) means that the statement is definitely not right, and 100 means that the statement is definitely right. The more likely you think it is that a given statement is right for that patient, the higher the number you should put. Please make sure you write a number beside each of the statements for each patient and don't miss any out.
Sodium trisulphate is CF and Wassmeier's Salts is P. The statement about ST is the CF p interpretation and the statement about WS is the P cause interpretation. Initial instructions given to participants in the nonenabling group were identical, except that the CF cause interpretation was presented instead of the CF p interpretation.
Patient information. The instructions were followed by 22 sheets each containing one problem. Each had the heading "Patient [initials]," with a different set of initials for each problem. The stimulus information was presented in four columns, listing the number of the meal, whether ST was present or absent, whether WS was present or absent, and whether an allergic reaction occurred or not. An example of a problem is shown in Appendix B. This is the problem from Subset 2, in which CF is a common factor, and it can be compared with the frequency tables and other information for that problem in Tables 2 and 3 . The number of meals per problem could not be held constant across problems because some independent variables were manipulations of frequencies, but was 24 in most cases. The 22 problems were randomly ordered, and a different random order was generated for each participant. The order of trials within problems was also randomized.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet and comfortably furnished small office. They began by reading the instructions described above. When they declared themselves ready to start, the experimenter handed them a booklet containing the written instructions and the 22 problems. Participants then proceeded through the booklet at their own pace. At the end of the session, participants were given credit, thanked, and debriefed.
There were 38 participants in the enabling group and 36 in the nonenabling group. Originally, 38 participated in the nonenabling group but 2 were excluded prior to analysis; 1 failed to complete ratings in several problems and the other was suspected of deliberate noncompliance (writing 4.449 for every judgment).
Results
Means for all subsets are reported in Table 4 . For the sake of clarity and brevity, only analyses directly related to the predictions under test are reported. The significance level is set at p = .05.
CF p Interpretation Versus P Cause Interpretation
It was hypothesized that, where there is a common factor and a positive covariate, the CF p interpretation should be preferred to the Table 4 Mean Judgments in Experiment I CF common, p(P) .33 CF common, p(P) .67 p(CF) .5, p(P) .33 p(CF) .5, p(P) .67 CF+ 8, AP(P) .6 CF+ 8, AP(P) .33 CF+ 4, AP(P) .6 CF+ 4, AP(P) .33 CF+ 0, CFP-0 CF+ 0, CFP-6 CF+ 6, CFP-0 CF+ 6, CFP-6 CF+ 2, CFP- P cause interpretation. There were 16 problems in which CF was a common factor. Mean ratings for the two interpretations in the enabling group are presented in Table 5 . As Table 5 shows, the CF p interpretation received the higher mean rating in all 16 comparisons, and the difference was statistically significant in 12 of them. This can be compared with the 6 problems in which CF was not a common factor; the relevant means are presented in Table 6 . In 4 of the 6 comparisons, the P cause interpretation received the higher mean, the difference being statistically significant in 2 cases. In the other 2, the CF p interpretation received the higher mean, the difference being statistically significant in 1 case. With one exception, therefore, the preference for the CF p interpretation was confined to conditions in which CF was a common factor.
CF p Interpretation Versus CF Cause Interpretation
It was predicted that the CF p interpretation would tend to receive higher ratings than the CF cause interpretation when CF is a common factor, and this prediction is not made when CF is not a common factor. The means are shown in the columns for the respective interpretations in Table 4 . Each pair of means was compared using the / test for related means. There were 16 problems in which CF was a common factor, and 13 of the 16 pairs showed a difference in the predicted direction. The difference was statistically significant (p < .05) in K of the 13 cases. Three pairs showed a difference in the unpredicted direction, and the difference was significant in 1 case. There were 6 problems in which CF was not a common factor, and there were no statistically significant differences. Most results were therefore as predicted, but 1 problem, the problem from Subset 4, in which CF+ frequency -8 and AP(P) -+.33, showed a statistically significant reversal. A possible explanation for this will be proposed in Discussion of Experiment I,
CF+ and CFP-Information
In Subset 4, CF+ frequency was manipulated (either four or eight instances) independently of AP(P), which was either +.6 or + .33. It was predicted that ratings of the CF p interpretation would vary with the frequency of CF+ trials and not with AP(P), and that ratings of the P cause interpretation would vary with AP(P) but not with CF+ frequency.
The former prediction was tested on ratings of the CF p interpretation by means of a 2 (CF+ frequency, 8 vs. 4) X 2 (AP(P), + .6 vs. +.33) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on both factors. Analysis yielded a significant main effect of CF+ frequency, F(l, 37) = 14.67, MSE = 592.53, with higher ratings when CF+ frequency = 4. The main effect of AP(P) was not significant, F(l, 37) = 0.45, MSE = 351.38, nor was the interaction, F(l, 37) = 0.48, MSE = 423.65. These results support the prediction.
Equivalent analyses were carried out on ratings of the P cause interpretation. In the enabling group, there were no significant effects. For CF+ frequency, F(l, 37) -0.54, MSE = 520.29. For AP(P), f (1, 37) = 2.64, MSE = 359.95. Although the trend was in the direction that would be expected if people judged on the basis of AP(P), it fell well short of statistical significance. The interaction was also nonsignificant, F(l, 37) = 0.38, MSE = 452,71. In the nonenabling group, there was again no significant effect of CF+ frequency, F(l, 35) = 0.01, MSE = 364.15, nor of AP(P), F(l, 35) = 0.03, MSE = 528.85. There was, however, a significant interaction, F(l, 35) -11.68, MSE = 222.01. As Table 4 shows, when CF+ frequency = 4, ratings of P were actually higher at the lower value of AP(P). A possible explanation for lack of differences between different levels of AP(P) will be proposed in Discussion of Experiment I.
In Subset 5, CF+ frequency and CFP-frequency were both manipulated with values of 0 and 6. The main prediction was that ratings of the CF p interpretation would be higher when CF+ frequency was 6 and CFP-was 0 than when the former was 0 and the latter 6. Although the data show a trend in the predicted direction (Table 4) , the trend did not approach statistical significance, t(¥l) -0.82. Unexpectedly, however, a statistically significant tendency in that direction was found for ratings of the CF cause interpretation, f(35) = 4.53.
In Subset 6, CF+ frequency and CFP+ frequency were manipulated while holding AP(P) constant at +.5. It was predicted that ratings of the CF p interpretation would be higher when the former frequency was lower (2 vs. 8 in this subset). The prediction was tested with a 2 (CF+ frequency, 2 vs. 8) X 2 (CFP+ frequency, 8 vs. 16) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. As predicted, a significant main effect of CF+ frequency was found, F(l, 37) = 25.01, MSE = 409.49, with higher ratings" at the lower value of CF+. A significant effect of CFP+ frequency was also found, F(l, 37) = 6.33, MSE = 659.28, with higher ratings when CFP+ frequency was higher.
The equivalent analysis was carried out for ratings of the CF cause interpretation, and no significant effects were found. For CF+ frequency, F(l, 35) = 2.03, MSE = 419.78; for CFP+ frequency, F(\, 35) = 0.74, MSE = 451.20; and for the interaction F(\, 35) = 0.84, MSE = 332.29. The manipulation of CF+ frequency, therefore, significantly affected ratings of the CF P interpretation but not the CF cause interpretation.
CF as a Common Factor Versus CF as a Positive Covariate
In Subset 1, as predicted, ratings of the CF p interpretation were significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when AP(CF) = +0.16, t(37) = 3.46. Therefore, with all conditional probabilities and AP(P) controlled, CF was more likely to be identified as the cause of the outcome in an enabled cause interpretation when it was a common factor than when it was a slightly positive covariate. It was hypothesized that the elevation in ratings of CF as a cause would be attributable to its inclusion in a complex causal interpretation. This hypothesis does not predict a similar elevation in ratings of CF on the CF cause interpretation. However, ratings of the CF cause interpretation were also significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when AP(CF) = +.16, f(35) = 2.13. Even in the absence of reference to an enabler, therefore, a factor is judged more likely to be the cause of an effect when it is a common factor than when it is a positive covariate with AP of +.16, with all conditional probabilities and AP(P) controlled. A possible explanation for this result will be proposed in Discussion of Experiment 1.
In Subset 2, one participant in the enabling group omitted one judgment for this subset and was excluded prior to analysis. Following significant effects in the initial ANOVA, paired comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that ratings of the CF p interpretation when CF was a common factor were significantly higher than when AP(CF) = +.33 or 0, and not significantly lower than when AP(CF) = +.67. Thus, it appears that a factor is judged about as likely to be the cause when it is a common factor as when it is a covariate with AP = +.67, when an enabled cause interpretation is being judged. Ratings of the CF cause interpretation when CF was a common factor, on the other hand, were significantly lower than when AP(CF) = +.67 or +.33, and not significantly different from when AP(CF) = 0.
In Subset 3, two problems in which CF was a common factor were compared with two otherwise similar problems in which CF was not a common factor. After an initially significant ANOVA, post hoc comparisons on the CF p interpretation with the NewmanKeuls test revealed that both conditions in which CF was a common factor received significantly higher ratings than both conditions in which CF was not a common factor. Post hoc comparisons on the CF cause interpretation revealed that the CF common/p(P) .67 problem was rated significantly higher than the CF common/ p(P) .33 problem and the p(CF) .5/p(P) .33 problem, but there were no other statistically significant differences. These results will also be explained in Discussion of Experiment 1.
Summarizing the results from these three subsets, the CF P interpretation was rated significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when CF was not a common factor. Ratings of the CF p interpretation were significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when CF was a positive covariate with AP = +.33, and not significantly different from ratings of the same interpretation when CF was a positive covariate with AP = +.67. This was not found for the CF cause interpretation. However, the CF cause interpretation was rated significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when CF was a covariate with AP = +.16.
Discussion of Experiment 1
The main hypothesis tested in Experiment 1 was that people would tend to prefer interpretations that were more nearly complete in their specification of causal roles. Specifically, it was predicted that when there was a common factor, consistently higher ratings would be given to the CF p interpretation than to the P cause interpretation and the CF cause interpretation. The results supported both predictions. The former is more interesting because it shows higher ratings being given to an interpretation identifying a common factor as the cause than to one identifying the positive covariate as the cause. Perhaps the most striking instance of this is the problem in Subset 5, in which AP(P) = +1.0 and p(E) = .5. In other words, CF was a common factor, P was present on exactly half of the instances, and the effect occurred on exactly that half of the instances on which P was present. It would appear that the effect is adequately accounted for by the perfect association with P, and there is no need to draw the common factor CF into the explanation. Yet, the CF p interpretation was rated, on average, 20 scale points higher than the P cause interpretation, a strongly significant difference. Table 4 shows that there were substantial differences in mean judgments of the CF p interpretation across problems. However, these differences are not well explained by AP. The clearest illustration of this is Subset 4, in which mean judgments varied with CF+ frequency and not with AP. Indeed, one condition with AP = +.33 was rated significantly higher than another condition with AP = +.6. There is, however, a simple model of judgment that appears consistent with the results. Because CFP+ and CFare confirmatory for the CF p interpretation and CFP-and CF+ are disconfirmatory, one way of combining these four kinds of information is just to compute the proportion of the total number of instances that are confirmatory. This will be referred to as pCJ, the proportion of confirming instances. This is related to the AD or sum of diagonals rule that has been much investigated in contingency judgment research (Allan & Jenkins, 1980 , 1983 Arkes & Harkness, 1983; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Shaklee & Hall, 1983; Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Shaklee & Wasserman, 1986; Wasserman, Domer, & Kao, 1990) . In terms of the 2 X 2 contingency table (see Table 1 ), AD = (a + d) -(b + c), and pCI = (a + d)/T, where T = the total number of instances in the table. The pCI rule uses proportions rather than sums because the total number of WHITE instances varied between problems in Experiment 1. Values of pCI for the 22 problems can be found in Table 3 .
Values of pCI tend to be positively correlated with AP but deviate from it under certain circumstances. For example, in Subset 6, AP is constant at + .5 but pCI varies from .67 to .90. Tables 3  and 4 show that mean judgments for this subset tended to vary in accordance with values of pCI, although with a nonsignificant reversal of direction for the two problems with the highest values of pCI. Moreover, in Subset 4, the condition in which CF+ frequency = 4 and AP = + .33 has the highest value of pCI of any problem in that subset; if people judged according to pCI, then that would explain why this problem received significantly higher ratings than a problem from the same subset that had a higher value of AP.
It is therefore hypothesized that people judge the CF p interpretation by pCI. The hypothesis leads to the prediction that manipulating pCI independently of AP should have a significant effect on judgments of the CF p interpretation, but that manipulating AP independently of pCI should not have a significant effect on judgments of the CF p interpretation. This prediction is tested in Experiment 2.
CF Cause Judgments
The currently prevailing inductive rule models of causal induction, the PC model (Cheng & Novick, 1990 , 1992 ) and the power PC theory (Cheng, 1997) , both postulate that causal judgment depends, subject to additional conditions, on AP. This implies that when CF is a common factor, it should not be judged to be a cause of the effect, because the lack of instances in which the factor is absent entails that AP cannot be computed. Under these models, when there is another factor present that is positively correlated with the outcome, that factor should be judged more likely to be the cause than the common factor. Some of the results of Experiment 1 did not support these predictions. In Subset 1, ratings of the CF cause interpretation were significantly higher when CF was a common factor than when AP(CF) = +.16. In Subset 4, ratings of the CF cause interpretation were significantly higher than ratings of the P cause interpretation when CF+ frequency = 8 and AP(P) = +.33, r(35) = 2.59. In other words, in that problem a common factor received higher ratings than a factor with AP = +.33.
Ratings of the CF cause interpretation were highly correlated with p(E) when CF was a common factor. Across the 16 relevant problems, r = + 0.93. This suggests that people may assess the CF cause interpretation from p(E) or from p(E/CF), because when CF is a common factor, p(E) = p(E/CF). The same cannot be said of the CFp interpretation because the correlation between p(E) and means on the CF P interpretation was only +0.27.
These results appear problematic for the PC model and power PC theory, but there may be a way of accommodating them. If people need information about what happens in the absence of CF in order to assess its causal status, one way of proceeding would be to make an assumption about p(E/-CF), the probability of occurrence of the effect when CF is absent. Then, whatever assumption people make, AP(CF) would covary with p(E/CF) in the stimulus materials, so long as the same assumption is made for each problem. In effect, people would be defining a focal set consisting of the stimulus information plus the assumption they make about p(E/-CF), and computing AP(CF) from that. This could explain the high correlation found between ratings of the CF cause interpretation and p(E).
The lowest possible value of p(E/-CF), in other words the one that yields the highest possible values of AP(CF), is zero. If we suppose that people tend to assume that p(E/-CF) = 0 (denoted the zero assumption), then some of the problematic findings can be explained. In Subset 4, the zero assumption would yield AP(CF) = + .50 and +.62 for the two problems in which AP(P) = +.6, and AP(CF) = +.83 and +.89 for the two problems in which AP(P) = +.33. This could therefore explain why ratings of the CF cause interpretation were higher for the latter two problems. It could also explain why ratings of the CF cause interpretation were higher than ratings of the P cause interpretation when CF+ frequency = 8 and AP(P) = +.33, because under the zero assumption AP(CF) would be +.67, which is higher than AP(P).
However, in the problem where CF+ frequency = 4 and AP(P) = + .33, under the zero assumption AP(CF) would be + .78. This is considerably higher than AP(P) = +.33, so higher judgments for CF would be predicted. In fact, there was no significant difference. In Subset 1, the zero assumption yields AP(CF) -+.16 for the CF common problem, which is (by design) the same as AP(CF) in the AP(CF) = +.16 problem. The zero assumption therefore fails to explain why the mean rating was significantly higher in the former. There is no way to make AP(CF) any higher than +.16 in the CF common problem because p(E/-CF) cannot be less than zero, so there is no possible assumption about p(E/ -CF) under which AP(CF) would be higher than +.16.
In summary, the zero assumption can explain some problematic results but not others. If people assume p(E/-CF) > 0, the findings are even harder to reconcile with the PC model and power PC theory. However, the hypothesis that judgments of the CF cause interpretation, like judgments of the CF interpretation, are based on pCI can explain the observed tendencies. To understand this, it is necessary to explain a little more about pCI.
pCI is defined as the proportion of instances that are confirmatory for a particular interpretation. Thus, the formula for pCI varies depending on the interpretation that is being judged. For a single candidate cause, pCI = (a+d)/T (see Table 1 ). For the CF p interpretation when CF is a common factor, pCI = [(CFP+) + (CF-)]/T. But for the CF cause interpretation, things are different because there are only two kinds of instances, occurrences of the effect in the presence of CF and nonoccurrences of the effect in the presence of CF. The former is confirmatory and the latter disconfirmatory for the CF cause interpretation, so pCI for the CF cause interpretation is just the number of the former divided by the total. This, of course, is p(E/CF), which is identical with p(E) when CF is a common factor. This explains why CF cause judgments were highly correlated with p(E); for the CF cause interpretation, p(E) = pCI. Therefore, the nearly perfect correlation observed between judgments of the CF cause interpretation and p(E) can be interpreted as evidence that judgments are made according to pCI.
This explains why the tendency for ratings of the CF P interpretation to be higher than ratings of the CF cause interpretation was not found in all problems. Both tend to vary with pCI, defined as [(CFP+) + (CF-)]/T for the CF P interpretation and p(E/CF) for the CF cause interpretation, so higher ratings would be predicted for the CF cause interpretation than for the CF p interpretation whenever pCI for the former is greater than pCI for the latter by an appreciable amount. Considering problems in which CF was a common factor, there was one problem in which the CF cause interpretation was rated significantly higher than the CF p interpretation. That was the problem in Subset 4, in which CF+ frequency = 8 and AP(P) = +.33. Consultation of Table 3 reveals that p(E) = .83 and pCI for the CF p interpretation = .67, and there is no other problem in which the former frequency exceeds the latter by so much. The significant difference in ratings can therefore be attributed to the difference in values of pCI.
P Cause Judgments
In Subset 4, a manipulation of AP(P) failed to produce a statistically significant effect on ratings of the P cause interpretation. Moreover, in Subset 6, although all four problems shared the same value of AP, mean judgments varied in accordance with pCI, just as judgments of the CF p interpretation did. This suggests that ratings of the P cause interpretation may also be determined by pCI and not by AP. This possibility will also be investigated in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 had two main aims. One was to replicate the main finding of Experiment 1, that of a general preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cause interpretation when CF is a common factor. The other was to manipulate pCI and AP(P) independently of each other to test the hypothesis derived from the results of Experiment 1 that judgments of the enabled cause interpretation are based on pCI.
Varying pCI while controlling AP cannot be achieved without p(E) and p(P) also varying, and the same is true for manipulating AP while controlling pCI. However, it is possible to control p(E) and p(P) by comparing pairs of problems. Each problem within a pair has the same value of pCI and the same value of AP, but p(E) and p(P) vary. But the sum of values of p(E) is constant across pairs of problems, and so is that of values of p(P). Thus, pCI can be manipulated between pairs of problems with the same values of AP and the same summed values of p(E) and p(P), and AP can be manipulated between pairs of problems with the same values of pCI and the same summed values of p(E) and p(P). In the subset manipulating pCI (called the pCI subset), there were three pairs of problems. In the subset manipulating AP (called the AP subset), there were two pairs of problems. For each pair, the sum of values of p(E) = 1.0, and the same is true for p(P).
Method Participants
The participants were 92 first-year undergraduate students of psychology at Cardiff University, participating in return for course credit.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The general features of the stimulus materials were similar to those in Experiment 1. In this experiment, there were two subsets, one (the pCI subset) holding AP(P) constant while manipulating pCI, and the other (the AP subset) holding pCI constant while manipulating AP(P). CF was a common factor in all cases. Table 7 presents event frequencies for all  problems, and Table 8 reports values of several parameters. In Tables 7 and 8, individual problems are identified by the value of pCI or AP, depending on the subset, and the value of p(E), which can be either H (high) or L (low).
The pCI subset comprised six problems with three different levels of pCT, .58, .67, and .75. AP(P) = +.5 in all cases, and comparisons between pairs of problems with the same value of pCI control for p(E) and p(P). The AP subset comprised four problems with two different levels of AP(P), +.5 and +.25, with pCI constant at .67. The first pair of the AP subset in Tables 7 and 8 is the middle pair of the pCI subset. In the AP subset p(P) and AP(P) were manipulated orthogonally. Any effect of p(E) can also be assessed by the comparison between the sum of two pairs, (+.5/H) + (+.25/L) versus (+.5/L) + (+.25/H).
The remainder of the stimulus materials, the initial written instructions and the rating tasks, were as in Experiment 1. An additional six problems were included with those for Subsets 1 and 2. In the information for these problems, there was no common factor. CF and P were both positively associated with E to varying degrees: In three cases AP(CF) was higher than AP(P), and in the other three the opposite was the case. These were fillers designed to ensure that the manipulations in the pCI and AP subsets were disguised and to distract attention from the fact that CF was a common factor in all problems in those subsets. Data from the fillers were not analyzed.
As in Experiment 1, enabling group (with the CF p interpretation) versus nonenabling group (with the CF cause interpretation) was a betweensubject factor. There were 47 participants in the former, and 45 in the latter.
All details of the procedure were as in Experiment 1.
Results
Means for both subsets are reported in Table 9 . The significance level was set at p = .05.
pCI Subset: pCI .58 Versus .67 Versus .75 Table 9 suggests an effect of pCI on ratings of the enabled cause interpretation; the lowest mean is found in one of the problems with the lowest pCI and the highest in one of the problems with the Note. H = high; L ~ low. highest pCI. However, the means also appear to be correlated with p(P). The stimulus materials were designed so that p(P) was controlled across comparisons between pairs of problems (see Table 8 ). Therefore, to eliminate any effect of p(P), ratings within pairs were added together. A two-way mixed design ANOVA was carried out on the resultant data with one between-subject factor (enabling vs. nonenabling group) and one within-subject factor (values of pCI),
WHITE
The analysis yielded a significant effect of group, F{\, 90) = 17.47, MSE = 2849.42, with higher ratings in the enabling group than in the nonenabling group. The main effect of pCI was only marginally significant, F(2,180) = 2.73, MSE = 792.57, p = .07. However, there was a significant interaction, F(2, 180) = 6.32, MSE -792.57. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of pCI in the enabling group, F(2, 180) = 8.22, MSE = 792.57. Planned comparisons using the Newman-Keuls test revealed that the mean for the lowest value of pCI (.58) was significantly lower than those for the other two values. Although the mean for the highest value of pCI (.75) was higher than that for the middle value, the difference between these two was not statis- Note. H = high; L = low. tically significant. With that exception, then, the results support the hypothesis that judgments of the CF p interpretation are based on pCI. The simple effects analysis revealed no significant effect of pCI in the nonenabling group, F(2, 180) = 0.99, MSE = 792.57. For ratings of the P cause interpretation, the same procedure was used to eliminate possible effects of p(P). Two-way mixed design ANOVA yielded a significant effect of values of pCI, F(2, 180) = 14.01, MSE = 3636.46. Planned comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that the highest value of pCI was rated significantly higher than the other two, which did not differ significantly. The main effect of group was not significant, F(l, 90) = 1.43, MSE = 822.39; nor was the interaction, F(2, 90) = 0.60, MSE = 822.39. These results support the hypothesis that ratings of P were based on pCI and not AP(P), and that this explains why ratings of P as a cause in Experiment 1 did not conform closely to AP(P).
AP Subset: AP +.5 Versus +.25; p(P) .33 Versus .67
This subset manipulated AP(P) while holding pCI constant. For the enabled cause interpretation a 2 (AP(P), +.5 vs. +.25) X 2 (p(P), .33 vs. .67) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors was carried out. The main effect of AP(P) was not significant, F( 1, 46) = 2.10, MSE = 306.60, nor was the interaction between the two factors, F(\, 46) = 2.26, MSE = 551.95. There was, however, a significant main effect of p(P), F(\ y 46) -16.12, MSE -483.14, with higher ratings when p(P) was .67. A specified contrast among means revealed no significant effect of p(E).
A similar analysis was carried out on the P cause interpretation and similar results were found. The main effect of AP(P) was not significant, F(l, 46) = 0.03, MSE = 382.86, nor was the interaction, F(U 46) = 0.23, MSE = 502.20. There was a significant main effect of p(P), F(l, 46) = 9.07, MSE = 523.89, again showing higher ratings when p(P) = .67. A specified contrast among means revealed no significant effect of p(E).
Enabling Group: Comparing the CF p and P Cause Interpretations
The CF p interpretation received a higher mean rating than the P cause interpretation in every problem, the difference being statistically significant (by related means t test) in seven out of the eight comparisons. This replicates the finding of a general preference for enabled cause over simple cause interpretations found in Experiment I.
CF Cause Judgments
In the nonenabling group, ratings of the CF cause interpretation were highly correlated with p(E), r ~ +.98. This also replicates the finding of Experiment 1.
Discussion of Experiment 2
The results supported the predictions. As in Experiment 1, the CF p interpretation was consistently given higher ratings than the P cause interpretation. Ratings of the CF p interpretation varied with pCI when AP(P) was controlled, and did not vary significantly with AP(P) when pCI was controlled. It was also found that ratings of P as a cause varied with pCI when AP(P) was controlled, and did not vary significantly with AP(P) when pCI was controlled. This tendency occurred in both the enabling and nonenabling groups.
Ratings of both the CF p and P cause interpretations were significantly affected by p(P). Where pCI is held constant, a manipulation of p(P) is in effect a manipulation of the proportion of joint presence (cause and outcome both present. Cell a information) to joint absence (cause and outcome both absent. Cell d information) instances, and that proportion is higher when p(P) is higher. It is a reliable finding in the contingency judgment literature that people give greater weight to confirmation by joint presence than to confirmation by joint absence (Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Arkes & Harkness, 1983; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Schustack & Stemberg, 1981; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994; Wasserman et aL, 1990) . It is therefore very likely that this is the explanation for the effect of p(P) observed here. In the CF p interpretation, it is the enabler that is jointly present or jointly absent with the outcome, not the cause, but as shown in the introduction the evidential implications are the same for the CF p interpretation as for the P cause interpretation, so the same explanation can apply.
Experiment 3
The first two experiments have uncovered a general tendency to give higher ratings to the CF p interpretation than to the P cause interpretation. However, these are not the only possible interpretations of a set of instances with a common factor and a positive covariate. Another possibility is that the covariate is the cause and the common factor is the enabler. This interpretation, which will be called the P cf interpretation, assigns the same number of causal roles as the CF p interpretation, so neither is preferred on grounds of completeness. However, the P cf interpretation conforms better to conventional models of causal judgment in that it assigns the role of cause to the covariate and not to the common factor. There are therefore grounds for thinking that the P cf interpretation might be preferred to the CF p interpretation. The main aim of Experiment 3 is to test this possibility.
Method Participants
The participants were 45 first-year undergraduate students of psychology at Cardiff University, participating in return for course credit.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
General features of the stimulus materials were similar to the previous two experiments, except that different names were used for the fictitious food additives. In this experiment, there were four subsets: Subset 4 of Experiment 1 (called the CF+/AP subset because those variables were manipulated). Subset 5 of Experiment 1 (called the CF+/CFP-subset because those variables were manipulated), and the two subsets from Experiment 2 (the pCI and AP subsets, respectively). The six problems used as fillers in Experiment 2 were also included here, and data from these were not analyzed.
Participants were asked to judge the following two interpretations: *'[CFJ causes the patient's allergic reactions but it is only enabled to do so by the presence of [P]" (the CF p interpretation). "[PI causes the patient's allergic reactions but it is only enabled to do so by the presence of [CF]" (the P cf interpretation). All participants judged both interpretations. No other interpretations were used in Experiment 3.
Results
Means for all subsets are reported in Table 10 . Results for individual subsets will be considered first. The significance level was set at p = .05. Data were analyzed with a 2 (CF P interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) X 2 (CF+ frequency, 8 vs. 4) x 2 (AP(P), +.6 vs. +.33) ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors. No effects were statistically significant. Post hoc comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that ratings of the CF p interpretation in the CF+ 4/AP(P) +.33 condition were significantly higher than ratings in all other conditions.
CF+/CFP-Subset: CF+ Frequency 0 Versus 6; CFP-Frequency 0 Versus 6
Data were analyzed with a 2 (CF p interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) X 2 (CF+ frequency, 0 vs. 6) X 2 (CFP-frequency, 0 vs. 6) ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors. Several effects were statistically significant.
The main effect of interpretation was significant, F(l, 44) = 10.74, MSE = 635.82, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation. The main effect of CF+ frequency was significant, F{\ t 44) = 59.52, MSE = 697.49, with higher ratings when CF+ = 0. The main effect of CFP-frequency was significant, F(l, 44) =* 61.24, MSE = 495.79, with higher ratings when CFP-= 0.
These effects were qualified by two interactions. There was a significant interaction between interpretation and CF+ frequency, F(\, 44) = 11.81, MSE = 378.23. Simple effects analysis revealed that the CF P interpretation received higher ratings than the P cf interpretation when CF+ = 0, F(l, 44) = 16.05, MSE = 696.15, but not when CF+ = 6, F(l, 44) = 0.39, MSE = 317.90.
There was also a significant interaction between CF+ frequency and CFP-frequency, F(l, 44) = 19.27, MSE = 337.36. Simple effects analysis revealed mat the pattern of the respective main effects was present throughout. The interaction probably reflects the fact that the mean in the 0/0 condition was considerably higher man means in the other three conditions.
pCI Subset: pCI .58 Versus .67 Versus .75 The materials were designed so that p(P) was controlled across comparisons between pairs of problems (see Table 8 ). As in Experiment 2, pCI subset, ratings within pairs were added together. This was done for both interpretations and a 3 (pCI, .58 vs. .67 vs. .75) X 2 (CF P interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors was carried out.
The analysis yielded a significant main effect of interpretation, F(1,44) = 6.62, MSE = 1961.99, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation. There was also a significant main effect of pCI, F(2, 88) = 7.07, MSE -1281.32, with mean ratings tending to increase as pCI increased.
The interaction fell short of statistical significance, F(l, 44) -1.57, MSE -510.78. However, it is important for theoretical reasons to look at the two interpretations separately, so simple effects were analyzed. For the CF p interpretation, the effect of pCI was significant, F(2, 88) = 8.25, MSE = 908.35. Post hoc comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that the mean for the lowest value of pCI was significantly lower than those for the other two values. Although the mean for the highest value of pCI was higher than that for the middle value, the difference between these two was not statistically significant. These results precisely replicate those of Experiment 2 for the CF p interpretation. For the P cf interpretation, the effect of pCI was marginally significant, F(2, 88) = 2.68, MSE = 883.76, p = .07, and post hoc comparisons revealed significantly higher ratings at pCI = .75 than at pCI = .58.
Ratings of the CF p interpretation were significantly higher than those of the P cf interpretation when pCI -.75, FO, 44) = 7.96, MSE = 793.03, and when pCI -.67, F(\, 44) = 6.15, MSE = 1168.10, but a trend in the same direction when pCI = .58 was not statistically significant, F(l, 44) = 1.08, MSE = 1022.43.
AP Subset: AP +.5 Versus +.25; p(P) .33 Versus .67
Data were analyzed with a 2 (CF p interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) X 2 (AP(P), +.5 vs. +.25) X 2 (p(P), .33 vs. .67) ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors. A significant main effect of interpretation was found, F(l, 44) -10.11, MSE = 591.09, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation. There was a significant main effect of p(P), F{\, 44) = 36.93, MSE -330.73, with higher ratings at the higher value of p(P). The main effect of AP(P) was not significant, F(l, 46) = 2.65, MSE = 640.30, and there were no significant interactions.
Discussion of Experiment 3
In three out of four subsets, there was a significant main effect of interpretation with higher ratings for the CF p interpretation. As Table 10 shows, in all 16 comparisons, the mean on the CF p interpretation was higher than the mean on the P cf interpretation, the difference being statistically significant in 6 cases. Thus, even though the CF p interpretation and the P u interpretation were of equal complexity, there was still a tendency for the former to be preferred.
The most striking example of this is the 0/0 condition of the CF+/CFP-subset. In this, as in the corresponding condition of Experiment 1, CF was a common factor and P was a perfect positive covariate. Yet, the interpretation in which the common factor was the cause was strongly preferred over that in which the perfect covariate was the cause. Thus, even when the covariate was perfectly associated with the outcome, and the two interpretations were of equal complexity and equivalent character, people still tended to identify the common factor as the cause in preference to the covariate.
The pCI and AP subsets produced further evidence that judgments of the CF p interpretation are determined by pCI and not by AP. The latter finding is reinforced by the lack of a significant effect of AP in the CF+/AP subset, and in fact the mean rating of the common cause interpretation with CF+ frequency = 4 was significantly higher at the lower value of AP. There was also some evidence that the P cf interpretation was judged according to pCI and not AP.
Although there was a general tendency for the CF p interpretation to be preferred to the P cf interpretation, the order of presentation of these two response alternatives was not counterbalanced on the response sheets, and the CF p interpretation was always presented first. This is a potential confound; it is possible, for example, that the ordering functioned as an implicit demand to give higher ratings to the alternative presented first. Experiment 4 was therefore designed as a complete replication of Experiment 3 but with properly counterbalanced ordering of the response alternatives. The replication also gives an opportunity to assess the reliability of the main findings of Experiment 3.
Experiment 4
Method
The participants were 48 first-year undergraduate students of psychology at Cardiff University, participating in return for course credit. All other details of method were as for Experiment 3, except that order of presentation of the two response alternatives was manipulated as a betweenparticipant variable, with 24 participants receiving the order in which the CF p interpretation was presented first (in every problem) and 24 receiving the order in which the P cf interpretation was presented first.
Results
Means for all subsets are reported in Table 11 . The significance level was set at p = .05.
CF+/&P Subset: CF+ Frequency 4 Versus 8; AP(P) +.33 Versus +.6
Initial analysis revealed no significant effect of or interaction with order. Data were therefore analyzed with a 2 <CF p interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) X 2 (CF+ frequency, 8 vs. 4) X 2 (AP(P), +.6 vs. +.33) ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors.
There was a significant effect of interpretation, f(l, 47) = 5.36, MSE = 928.10, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation than on the P cf interpretation. There was a significant effect of CF+ frequency, F(l, 47) = 4.24, MSE = 441.47, with higher ratings when CF+ frequency = 4. There was a significant effect of AP(P), F(l, 47) = 4.78, MSE = 775.99, with higher ratings when AP(P) = +.33. There were no statistically significant interactions. Although the corresponding analysis in Experiment 3 yielded no statistically significant effects, post hoc comparisons did reveal that ratings of the CF p interpretation in the CF+ 4/AP(P) +.33 condition were significantly higher than ratings in all other conditions, and the same was the case in this experiment. In both experiments, the highest mean on the P cf interpretation was found in the CF+ 4/AP(P) +.33 condition, and the present results indicate that this is a reliable tendency. Finally, there was a replication of the general preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cf interpretation, and the difference was statistically significant in two out of four comparisons, as shown in Table 11 .
CF+/CFP-Subset: CF+ Frequency 0 Versus 6; CFP-Frequency 0 Versus 6
Initial analysis revealed no significant effect of or interaction with order. Data were analyzed with a 2 (CF p interpretation vs. P cf interpretation) X 2 (CF+ frequency, 0 vs. 6) X 2 (CFP-frequency, 0 vs. 6) ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors. Several effects were statistically significant There was a significant effect of interpretation, F(l, 47) = 6.13, MSE = 549.11, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation than on the P cf interpretation. There was a significant effect of CF+ frequency, f(l, 47) = 32.91, MSE = 725.02, with higher ratings when CF+ = 0. There was a significant effect of CFP-frequency, F(l, 47) = 63.83, MSE = 871.16, with higher ratings when CFP-= 0.
These main effects were qualified by several statistically significant interactions. There was a significant interaction between interpretation and CF+ frequency, F(l, 47) -5.39, MSE -429.92. Simple effects analysis revealed that the preference for the CF p interpretation was significant when CF+ frequency = 0, F(l, 47) = 8.75, MSE = 644.03, but not when CF+ frequency = 6, F(l, 47) = 0.15, MSE = 334.99. There was a significant interaction between interpretation and CFP-frequency, F(l, 47) = 5.77, MSE = 437.67. Simple effects analysis revealed that the preference for the CF p interpretation was significant when CFP-frequency = 0, F(l, 47) ^ 7.20, MSE = 814.26, but not when CF+ frequency = 6, F(l, 47) = 0.17, MSE = 172.53. There was also a significant interaction between CF+ frequency and CFP-frequency, F(l, 47) = 6.51, MSE = 555.74. As for the corresponding interaction in Experiment 3, this reflects the fact that the mean in the 0/0 condition was considerably higher than the means in the other three conditions. These three two-way interactions were in turn qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F{1,47) -5.07, MSE -389.33. Post hoc paired comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that the preference for the CF p interpretation over P cf interpretation was statistically significant only in the 0/0 condition, which largely accounts for the two two-way interactions involving interpretation.
pCI Subset: pCI .58 Versus .67 Versus .75 As in Experiments 2 and 3, ratings within pairs were summed. Preliminary analysis revealed one significant interaction with order, an interaction between order, interpretation, and pCI, F(2, 92) -4.04, MSE = 977.11. This will be described shortly.
WHITE
The main analysis yielded a significant main effect of interpretation, F(l, 47) = 13.25, MSE = 1,395.45, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation than on the P cf interpretation. There was a significant effect of pCI, F(2, 94) = 6.15, MSE = 1,705.62, with mean ratings tending to increase as pCI increased.
There was a significant interaction between interpretation and pCI, F(2, 94) = 5.90, MSE = 527.80. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant effect of pCI on the CF p interpretation, F{2, 94) = 10.02, MSE = 1,241.60. Post hoc comparisons with the Newman-Keuls test revealed that the mean for the highest value of pCI was significantly higher than those for the other two levels, which did not differ significantly, although the trend was in the predicted direction. There was no significant effect of pCI on the P rf interpretation, F(2,94) = 1.17, MSE = 991.82, although there was a trend for means to increase with increase in pCI. The interaction with order alluded to above indicates a somewhat stronger tendency for ratings to increase with increasing pCI when the CF p interpretation was placed first than when it was placed second, but there was an effect of pCI at both levels of order. No such difference was apparent on the P cf interpretation. The tendency observed when the CF p interpretation was placed first replicated that found in Experiment 3.
AP Subset: AP +.5 Versus +.25; p(P) .33 Versus .67 As in Experiments 2 and 3, ratings within pairs were summed. Preliminary analysis revealed one significant interaction with order, an interaction between order, interpretation, and AP, F{2, 92) = 5.62, MSE = 1,096.88. This will be described shortly.
The main analysis yielded a significant main effect of interpretation, F(l, 47) = 7.38, MSE = 524.23, with higher ratings on the CF p interpretation than on the P cf interpretation. The main effect of AP(P) was not significant, F(l, 47) = 1.87, MSE = 691.55, nor was the interaction between interpretation and AP(P), F(\, 47) = 0.31, MSE = 214.49. The interaction with order appears to show a tendency for ratings of the CF p interpretation to vary with AP(P) when it was placed first and not when it was placed second, and the converse for ratings of the P cf interpretation. However, because there is no other evidence for a significant effect of AP(P), this result should perhaps be shown to be reliable before being treated as meaningful, The tendency observed when the CF p interpretation was placed first was not found in Experiment 3, although there was a nonsignificant trend in that direction.
Discussion of Experiment 4
There were, in all, 24 effects (4 main effects and 20 interactions) involving the order of presentation variable, and 2 of these produced F ratios that were statistically significant at the .05 level. This is not out of line with the chance expectation, and there is no reason to conclude that order has much effect unless the significant results can be replicated.
The main aim of Experiment 4 was to test the hypothesis that the general tendency to prefer the CF p interpretation in Experiment 3 was due to the failure to counterbalance order of presentation of the two response alternatives. This hypothesis can be rejected. In all four subsets of Experiment 4, there was a significant main effect of interpretation with higher ratings for the CF p interpretation. As in Experiment 3, in all 16 comparisons, the mean on the CF p interpretation was higher than the mean on the P cf interpretation, the difference being statistically significant this time in seven cases. Five of the six differences that were statistically significant in Experiment 3 were statistically significant in Experiment 4 as well, indicating a good degree of reliability in the findings. Therefore, not only is the general tendency to give higher ratings to the CF p interpretation reliable when order of presentation is counterbalanced, but also the same conditions were associated with the strongest preferences for the CF p interpretation. The greatest difference between means on the CF p and P cr interpretations was found in the same condition in both experiments, this being the condition in which the covariate had perfect positive contingency with the effect.
The results also reinforce the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 that judgments of the CF p interpretation are determined by pCI and not by AP(P). In the case of the P cf interpretation, although there was a trend in the direction predicted by pCI, it was not statistically significant, so further research would be necessary to ascertain the status of pCI as a predictor of P,., interpretation judgments.
General Discussion
The experiments have yielded three main findings. Even without any reference to enablers, people were not reluctant to interpret common factors as causes. Under some circumstances, common factors received higher ratings as causes than did positive covariates of the effect. For example, for one problem in Experiment 1, Subset 4, a common factor was rated significantly higher as a cause of the effect (CF cause M = 66.14) than a factor with AP = + .33 (P cause M -48.44). In Subset 1 of Experiment I, a common factor was given significantly higher ratings as a cause (CF cause interpretation) than was a factor with AP = +.16.
When there was a common factor the CF p interpretation was consistently preferred to other interpretations. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was consistently preferred to the P cause interpretation. It was also preferred to the CF cause interpretation in most cases. In Experiments 3 and 4, it was consistently preferred to the P c) interpretation. The extent to which the CF p interpretation was preferred to the P cl interpretation varied between judgmental problems in a way that was shown to be reliable.
Ratings of the CF p interpretation, the P cause interpretation, the CF cause interpretation, and, in Experiment 3, the P cf interpretation, all varied with pCI, the proportion of confirming instances, and not with AP.
Preference for the CF p Interpretation: A Possible Explanation
It was hypothesized that the CF p interpretation would be preferred to the P cause interpretation because it was more nearly complete in its assignment of factors to causal roles. The results gave some support to that interpretation, because differences between the CF p interpretation and the P cf interpretation observed in Experiments 3 and 4 tended to be smaller than differences between the CF p interpretation and the P cause interpretation observed with otherwise identical stimulus materials in Experiments 1 and 2. For example, in Experiment 2, the CF p interpretation was rated significantly higher than the P cause interpretation in seven out of eight cases. On the same comparisons (the pCI and AP subsets), the CF interpretation was rated significantly higher than the P cf interpretation in only two out of eight cases in Experiment 3, and three out of eight in Experiment 4. It is not clear whether this reduced difference is due to the increased complexity of the latter interpretation or to the particular character of the added component, but it is certainly consistent with the complexity hypothesis.
Complexity does not explain the preference for the CF p interpretation over the P rf interpretation found in Experiments 3 and 4, however, because both interpretations are equal in specification of causal roles. The results, therefore, show a reliable tendency to prefer an interpretation identifying a common factor as the cause to one identifying a positive covariate as the cause, a tendency that has no precedent in the causal judgment literature.
The most striking example comes from the CF+/CFP-subset of Experiments 3 and 4. In this subset, there was a problem in which CF was a common factor and P was a perfect positive covariate of the outcome, with six instances of P being present and the effect occurring and zero of P being absent and the effect not occurring. This is precisely the circumstance under which one would expect the strongest causal attribution to the covariate. Because CF was a common factor and no information about any other factors was presented, all conventional models of causal judgment from contingency information would agree in predicting that P should be identified as the cause of the outcome. In fact, the common factor was identified as the cause in preference to the positive covariate in both experiments. The two interpretations were syntactically similar and matched for complexity. The stimulus information was simple and unambiguous, and participants were able to view all of it for as long as they wished before making a judgment.
This tendency therefore calls into question the assumption that perfect covariates will tend to be identified as causes; that proposition may hold only when no more than one candidate cause is under consideration or when participants are constrained to judge only simple cause interpretations, that is, interpretations that assign no causal roles other than those of cause and effect. The evidence of the present research is that this is a severe and unrepresentative constraint and that people not only understand the causal role of an enabler but both make and prefer interpretations of contingency information that assign the role of enabler.
A possible explanation of this tendency can be ascertained by consideration of the form of the CF p interpretation. The statement reads "[Factor A] causes the patient's allergic reactions but it is only enabled to do so by the presence of [Factor By* It has a main clause about a cause qualified by a subsidiary clause about an enabler. Now consider a slightly amended phrasing: "Factor A causes the patient's allergic reactions but only when Factor B is present." This phrasing lays bare the fact that the statement implicitly specifies both the kind of instance that is relevant to an assessment of the proposition and the pattern of information that fits the proposition. The relevant instances are those where Factor A is present, and the pattern of information that fits the proposition is one in which Factor B covaries with the effect. Now, in the case of the CF p interpretation, the condition with the perfect covariate fits this specification precisely: All instances are relevant because Factor A (the common factor) is present in all instances, and the pattern of information is right because there is exact covariation between Factor B and the effect. In the case of the P cf interpretation, however, the fit is not precise. In this case, Factor A is the covariate, so one half of the instances, those in which the factor is absent, are not relevant. Furthermore, covariation between Factor B and the effect cannot be assessed because Factor B (the common factor in this interpretation) is never absent. The condition with the common factor and the perfect covariate is therefore a precise fit with the CF p interpretation, but not a good fit with the P cf interpretation. This may explain why the former was rated higher than the latter. This is not a mere linguistic contrivance, the appending of a subsidiary clause about an enabler to a main clause about a cause. This becomes apparent if we try to make the enabler the subject of the main clause. Something like this would result: Factor A is an enabler for Factor B to cause the effect, but only when Factor B is present. In this case, the subsidiary clause is superfluous because the presence of Factor B is automatically assumed in instances where Factor B causes the effect. It makes sense to assess a claim about a cause-enabler combination by looking for instances where the putative enabler is absent, but it does not make sense to do so by looking for instances where the cause is absent, because in such instances the cause would not produce the effect anyway, regardless of whether or not the other factor was an enabler for it. This asymmetry follows logically from the functional definitions of the roles of cause and enabler.
The consistent preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cf interpretation in the condition with the perfect covariate therefore captures a basic truth about cause-enabler propositions, that they are only properly tested by considering instances where the putative cause is present. The pattern of information in the condition with the perfect covariate precisely fits what would be expected if the common factor were the cause and the covariate the enabler: Every instance is both relevant and confirmatory.
The extent of preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cf interpretation varied between problems, and this pattern of variation was shown to be reliable across Experiments 3 and 4. Not only is it reliable, it is also predictable from pCI. For each problem in Experiment 4, the difference between the mean ratings of the CF p and P cf interpretations was calculated and then correlated with pCI across problems, and a significant positive association was found, r= +O.78,p < .05. Thus, as the degree of fit between the stimulus information and the CF p interpretation declines, as assessed by pCI, so the preference for the CF p interpretation over the P cf interpretation declines. Where the pattern of information offers only mixed support for the CF p interpretation, the grounds for preferring it to the P cf interpretation are correspondingly weakened. The condition with the perfect covariate is, in this respect, the ideal condition, the one in which the superiority of fit to the CF p interpretation is most transparent. It is therefore not surprising that the greatest difference between ratings of the CF p and P cf interpretations was found in this condition in both Experiment 3 and 4. This may not be the whole story, however. There was evidence that common factors were sometimes preferred to covariates as causes even when only simple cause interpretations (i.e., interpretations assigning only the roles of cause and effect) were being considered (Experiment 1). This can be explained as an effect of focal set construction.
There has been little research on how people sample instances for contingency assessment. Some studies, however, have shown a tendency for many participants to prefer cause-present instances (Table 1 , Cells a and b) and to neglect cause-absent instances (Cells c and d). Anderson and Sheu (1995) asked participants about their use of contingency information and found a substantial minority who reported that they had ignored Cells c and d. Consistent with this, Cells c and d had little or no effect on those participants' causal judgments. Adi, Karplus, Lawson, and Pulos (1978) also found that participants tended to use just two cells for causal judgment, whereas other participants asked to perform a covariation judgment task on the same contingency information almost all used all four cells. Although Adi et al. did not report which two cells were selected for causal judgment, the findings do show selection of cells; because the stimulus information and other features of the covariation and cause judgment tasks were identical in every respect, the failure of causal judgment participants to do so cannot be attributed to task difficulty and must presumably have been a matter of choice.
To neglect cause-absent information is to construct a focal set in which there is only cause-present information, in other words a set in which the causal candidate is a common factor. Because people generally agree that occurrences of the effect in the presence of the candidate are confirmatory and nonoccurrences are disconfirmatory, p(E) should be a good predictor of causal judgment in this case. The present results support this reasoning: Judgments of the CF cause interpretation were almost perfectly correlated with p(E). Judging the causal status of a common factor from p(E) is therefore no less natural for ordinary people than judging the causal status of a covariate from a + d/T. If, in most cases, the covariate tends to receive higher causal judgments than the common factor, this is only because pCI is usually higher for covariates than for common factors. When pCI is controlled, the common factor receives higher ratings than the covariate. This is shown in Experiment 1, Subset 1, where the CF cause interpretation received higher ratings when CF was a common factor than when CF was a positive covariate, with pCI = .67 in both cases.
The emphasis all through the history of causal judgment research has been on the construction of sets of instances to judge causes. It may be, however, that people often, and perhaps usually, construct sets of instances to identify enablers. Many of the causal questions we ask concern things going wrong, such as failures of usual or expected events to occur (Hart & Honore, 1959; Weiner, 1985) . In these cases, there is a causal relation that usually obtains, but on the occasion that prompts the causal question the relation does not obtain. The aim of causal analysis is to account, not for a causal relation, but for the failure of an expected causal relation to occur. For example, if I press the button on the kettle and water boils, I think no more about it. But if the water does not boil, then I ask why. This may well lead to a search for something that covaries with the outcome, but that something is not a cause of the outcome, it is an enabler. There may be several things that enable a kettle to boil water when the button is pressed, and the absence or inoperativeness of one of them will provide the answer to the causal question. Let us say that the wall switch was off. This covaries with boiling; when water boils, the switch is on. In this case, the usual outcome failed to occur not because the cause was absent (it was not) but because it was disabled. The example is defective because we can call on preconceived beliefs rather than constructing a set of instances, but the principle is clear. Most causal questions concern failures of expected or usual events to occur, and (where only contingency information is available) most are answered by identifying a covariate that is an enabler (or an absent or inoperative enabler).
Role ofpCI in Causal Judgment
There was abundant evidence that causal judgments in the present research were based on pCI, not AP. Manipulations of AP tended to be ineffective, and in some cases significantly higher judgments were observed with lower values of AP (Experiment 1, Subset 4, CF+ frequency 4, P cause interpretation; Experiment 3, CF+/AP subset, CF+ frequency 4, CF p interpretation). Experiments 2, 3, and 4 manipulated pCI and AP independently and found that judgments of the CF p interpretation and P cause interpretation (Experiment 2) and the CF p interpretation and P cf interpretation (Experiments 3 and 4) varied with pCI and not with AP. CF cause judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 were almost perfectly predicted by p(E), which as we have seen is pCI for that interpretation.
If it is accepted that pCI is the preferred method of judging the causal status of a common factor, then there may be a simple explanation for the finding that judgments of P were also associated with pCI. If people adopt a given method for one judgment, the least cognitively demanding procedure is to use the same method for the other candidate as well. Thus, so long as there is no indication that the method is invalid or cannot be used, people judging CF from pCI will tend to judge P from pCI as well, because this procedure imposes the smallest load on cognitive capacity. However, it is also possible that the pCI rule is the usual means of making causal judgments, and there is evidence that it was used by participants in other published experiments as well. Under many circumstances, pCI and AP are perfectly correlated and generate identical ordinal predictions. In some studies, however, they can be distinguished. This is not the place for a full review of literature, but one study will be taken as an example.
Wassennan, Kao, Van Hamme, Katagiri, and Young (1996, Experiment 1) tested 13 contingency judgment problems in all of which AP = 0. Some participants gave judgments after each trial, others only after the final trial. Final judgments of both groups varied significantly between problems. Wasserman et al. (1996) argued that the results were consistent with both information integration theory (Busemeyer, 1991) and the Rescorla-Wagner model of associative learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . They are consistent with the present account as well. pCI and p(E/C) both tended to vary across problems, but it is possible to assess the effect of pCI by comparing problems sharing the same value of p(E/C). (In the following analyses, means for the running-estimate and final-estimate groups are averaged together.)
There were two pairs of problems in which p(E/C) was constant and pCI varied. In Problems 7 and 9, p(E/C) = .33 in both, but pCI = .54 in Problem 7 and .46 in Problem 9. The pCI rule therefore predicts higher mean judgment in Problem 7, and this was found. In Problems 10 and 12, p(E/C) *= .67 in both, but pCI = .54 in Problem 12 and .46 in Problem 10. The pCI rule therefore predicts higher mean judgment in Problem 12, and this was found. These are the only problems in which p(E/C) was constant and pCI varied. However, in four of the problems (8, 9, 10, 11) pCI = .46, in five (1,2,3,4, 5) pCI = .50, and in four (6,7, 12, 13) pCI = .54. Overall means for judgments in each of these three groups were -0.45, +0.50, and +1.12, respectively, and this increasing trend is consistent with the hypothesis that judgments were made in accordance with pCI.
Experiments in which pCI and AP have been differentiated have therefore tended to support the present results in finding that pCI predicts obtained differences in judgments. At the very least, this suggests that an account of causal judgment incorporating pCI could be a serious contender.
Associative Learning
Several authors have postulated that human causal judgment from contingency information is explicable in terms of associative learning (Allan, 1993; Shanks, 1993 Shanks, , 1995 Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994; Wasserman et al., 19%) . This account of causal judgment draws strength from the demonstration of several parallels with phenomena of animal learning, such as studies of cue interaction effects (e.g., Allan, 1993; Baker, Mercier, Vallee-Tourangeau, Frank, & Pan, 1993; Chapman, 1991; Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Price & Yates, 1993; Shanks, 1989 Shanks, , 1995 , and it usually takes as its model the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . It is not clear whether the Rescorla-Wagner model is applicable to the present research because it does not explicitly differentiate causal roles. However, there may be a parallel to be drawn with another area of conditioning research, specifically the phenomenon known as occasion setting (Holland, 1985; Ross, 1983; Ross & Holland, 1981 .
In a feature positive discrimination one stimulus, A, is reinforced when presented with a feature stimulus X and not when presented in the absence of X. When A and X were presented simultaneously, animals acquired an association between X and the unconditioned stimulus (US) but not between A and the US. However, when X was presented prior to A, "X additionally acquired the ability to signal when the A-US relation would be in effect" (Holland, 1985, p. 269) . In other words, when X is temporally prior to A, X sets the occasion for a relation between A and the US.
In this case, A is equivalent to a common factor and X is equivalent to a positive covariate, and what is learned by the animal could be regarded as equivalent to a human learning that A causes the outcome but only when X is present, in other words that X (the covariate) enables A (the common factor) to bring about the outcome. To my knowledge, there have been no studies that have investigated the role of occasion setting in human causal judgment, but the possibility that the mechanisms involved could also account for patterns of causal judgment observed with common factors is certainly worthy of investigation. However, occasion setting occurs when the feature stimulus X is temporally prior to A and not when the two are simultaneous. In the present study, information about the two causal candidates was presented simultaneously, so there is a need to explain how phenomena observed with temporally ordered cues in animals can explain phenomena observed with simultaneously presented cues in humans. Nonetheless, occasion setting may be a useful paradigm for human causal judgment research to pursue.
Multiple Role Conceptualization of Causality
The central contention of the present account is that people have a multiple functional role conceptualization of causality and that contingency information is assessed in terms of its evidential value for interpretations constructed on this foundation of concepts of functional roles. The present research has investigated only one role in addition to the roles of cause and effect, that of the enabler, defined in terms of its function of making it possible for a cause to produce its effect. Other kinds of functional roles in relation to causes are possible. Examples include inhibitors or preventers, which may be characterized as conditions under which a cause cannot bring about an effect that, under other circumstances, it would (e.g., a pillar prevents the force of gravity from bringing a roof crashing to the ground), and abnormal conditions, characterized as deviations from what is usual or expected under given circumstances (Harre* & Madden, 1975; Hart & Honore", 1959; Mackie, 1965 Mackie, , 1974 Sosa & Tooley, 1993) . Harr6 and Madden distinguished two roles in the causation of an event, the causal power of a thing (e.g., the strength of a hammer) and a stimulus condition (e.g., forceful contact between the hammer and a plate), the two together being necessary for the occurrence of the effect. It is important to investigate the extent to which these or other concepts may be represented in the common sense conceptualization of causality, not only for the sake of completing our theoretical picture of the understanding of causality but also because the present results indicate that the specification of additional causal roles in interpretations can have profound effects on tendencies found in judgments of those interpretations.
In conclusion, the evidence of this research is that there is a significant conceptual input to the processes of causal judgment in humans, comprising a functional role conceptualization of causality and notions of the evidential value of contingency information, that contributes to the interpretation of judged associations in terms of causal relations.
